Explaining what made ancient Greek law unusual, Michael Gagarin observes that most premodern legal cultures "wrote extensive sets (or codes) of laws for academic purposes or propaganda but these were not intended to be accessible to most members of the community and had relatively little effect on the actual operation of the legal system." This article addresses the implications of writing for customary or regional law in South and Southeast Asia. The textual tradition of Dharmaśāstra ("Hindu law"), which canonizes a particular model of Brahmin customary norms, can certainly be called a "scholarly" exercise, and it was also intended as propaganda for the Brahmanical cosmopolitan world order. But it also formulated a procedural principle to recognize the general validity of other, even divergent, customary norms, though for the most part such rules remained lex non scripta. On the other hand, inscriptions provide evidence that writing was used for diverse legal purposes and offers glimpses of actual legal practice. In these records, customary laws are sometimes laid down as statutes by decree of a ruler or community body, or are simply invoked as long-established customary rules. But even when Dharmaśāstra texts are not directly cited, their influence over the longue durée is discernable in the persistence of śāstric legal categories and terms of art. This influence is even more evident in Java, where legal codes on the Dharmaśāstra model were composed in Javanese, and where the inscriptions came to exhibit a closer connection with śāstric discourse than is found in India.
Explaining what made ancient Greek law unusual, Michael Gagarin observes that most premodern legal cultures "wrote extensive sets (or codes) of laws for academic purposes or propaganda but these were not intended to be accessible to most members of the community and had relatively little effect on the actual operation of the legal system." This article addresses the implications of writing for customary or regional law in South and Southeast Asia. The textual tradition of Dharmaśāstra ("Hindu law"), which canonizes a particular model of Brahmin customary norms, can certainly be called a "scholarly" exercise, and it was also intended as propaganda for the Brahmanical cosmopolitan world order. But it also formulated a procedural principle to recognize the general validity of other, even divergent, customary norms, though for the most part such rules remained lex non scripta. On the other hand, inscriptions provide evidence that writing was used for diverse legal purposes and offers glimpses of actual legal practice. In these records, customary laws are sometimes laid down as statutes by decree of a ruler or community body, or are simply invoked as long-established customary rules. But even when Dharmaśāstra texts are not directly cited, their influence over the longue durée is discernable in the persistence of śāstric legal categories and terms of art. This influence is even more evident in Java, where legal codes on the Dharmaśāstra model were composed in Javanese, and where the inscriptions came to exhibit a closer connection with śāstric discourse than is found in India. introduction Modern lawyers sometimes have trouble seeing custom or "folk law" as law at all, at least in a formal sense. The ninteenth-century legal theorist John Austin's classical formula held that law consists of the commands of a sovereign backed by the threat of sanctions. Custom in itself is mere habit until it is gets adopted by judges (and thus tacitly by the sovereign). 1 More recent positive law theorists have tended to insist that in the absence of a constitution, a legislative apparatus, and a bureaucratic state able to provide for enforcement, there can be no legal rules per se, only maxims or customs. To have law, said the positivists, there must be a "basic norm" (Grundnorm: Kelsen 1949) or a "rule of recognition" (Hart 1994 (Hart [1961 ), that is, a rule with broad acceptance in accordance with which all other laws derive This article began as a lecture at the University of Virginia, 24 February 2011. The research was largely conducted under the auspices of the Institut français de Pondichéry during 2009-10, with the support of a Fulbright-Hays FRA fellowship. Revisions were made during the following year with a sabbatical fellowship from the American Philosophical Society and from a Lenfest Sabbatical Fellowship (Washington and Lee University). I am grateful to these institutions for their support. I have benefited from comments by Patrick Olivelle, David Brick, Arlo Griffiths, and anonymous readers for the Journal.
1. Austin 1995 Austin (1832 to admit that even in a largely customary legal culture "rules is rules": written rules may be accorded a special value that makes them notably different from other legal standards, in coercive force, in jurisdiction, or simply in relative weight. Given a system with some sort of means of recognition, many sorts of standards-moral or ritual precepts, maxims, customary norms, and principles-can be formally recognized as law, and so put to uses such as endowing with rights, imposing an obligation, facilitating litigation, or justifying state violence.
rules in indic law
We should consider whether premodern Indian society had law in Hart's sense (or in Ronald Dworkin's, which acknowledges the legal applications not only of rules but of principles and policies), 8 and if so, what mechanisms we can discern for the recognition of customary norms and other standards as law. Was there a difference in theory or in practice between different sorts of standards? And what effects did writing have on the process? If one important effect was to formalize a rule, to clarify its jurisdiction, or to spell out its consequences, does it make sense to regard this as a mode of recognition? What can the premodern Indic evidence contribute to comparative discussion of recognition of laws?
writing Explaining what made ancient Greek law unusual, Michael Gagarin observes that most other premodern legal cultures "wrote extensive sets (or codes) of laws for academic purposes or propaganda but these were not intended to be accessible to most members of the community and had relatively little effect on the actual operation of the legal system" (2008: 1). This characterization applies well to Dharmaśāstra, generally speaking, but not to all legal uses of writing in India. Dharmaśāstra certainly can be regarded as a "scholarly" exercise-"Hindu jurisprudence" 9 -and it was intended as propaganda for the Brahmanical cosmopolitan world order.
But writing also served other functions in India. An enormous number of inscriptions on stone and copper plates have survived, and these presuppose and sometimes explicitly attest to the use of palm leaves and other perishable materials for the purpose of framing and transmitting such documents. These documents, commonly called lekha ('writing, writ') or pattra ('leaf') , are used to record decrees (most commonly to confer land rights and other benefices), settlements in a public or private dispute, or charters of customary rules. Donative decrees and settlements doubled as deed or title to property rights and privileges, and there are a number of instances in which the record refers to its own capacity to forestall or resolve future disputes over such rights. The use of inscriptions to promulgate statutes of general application is rare in India, but not unheard of. The durability of the written document is paramount. Records often close with a formula invoking their validity in perpetuity, "as long as the moon and sun endure," and warning future rulers not to violate their terms.
In Southeast Asia, from Burma to Borneo, the importation and appropriation of Indian cultural habits and institutions, including legal ones, took the form both of inscriptions (initially in Sanskrit, but then bilingual and in local languages), and of law-codes superficially modeled on Dharmaśāstras but mostly local in language and content. 10 This development is particularly instructive in its contrast with the closest analogy in India, where the regional Dharmaśāstras, few as they were, were composed in Sanskrit (e.g., the Laghudharmaprakāśikā or Śāṃkarasmṛti, from Kerala).
In all these spheres, there are signs that the interplay between Dharma texts and inscriptions fostered the emergence of formal legal institutions that were tied simultaneously to local social bodies and state structures, and to an overarching, transregional conception of legitimate authority. What is most likely to be left out of account are unwritten norms-rules that, to proponents of legal realism and legal pluralism, have legal functions even though they are not part of a formal code. We will see some of these as they show up in inscriptions.
In what follows, we will briefly consider what the early Dharmaśāstra had to say about regional and parochial norms, before turning to the epigraphy to illustrate the range of legal functions that writing could serve in practice. Our examples come from a wide range of times and places. There is room here for only the barest sketch of the historical context; in any case, for some types of records the numbers are too few to permit a highly nuanced view of local distinctions. At the same time, the basic legal functions of inscriptions (and their palmleaf or paper analogues) seem to have remained fairly stable over time and space for over a millennium at least. Indeed, it has been shown that in South India, the source of the largest number of inscriptions, even palm-leaf legal documents produced in the mid-nineteenth century "are written in a documentary language which has been in vogue since medieval times"; indeed, "they resemble very closely medieval inscriptions in style, format and contents and so they indirectly help in a better understanding of the inscriptions." 11 dharmaśāstra Dharmaśāstra ("Hindu law") canonizes a particular model of Brahmin customary standards (ācāra)-those practiced in the "Land of the Āryas" (Āryāvarta) 12 -and it does so in a mixture of edifying maxims and substantive apodictic rules on specific points. It is likely that many of these were considered normative within particular Brahmin circles at particular times, though we cannot now know where or when exactly. 13 Futhermore, the śāstra-authors took it as part of their task to compile traditional precepts, but not always to reconcile them when they diverge. The result is in some sense a code-a systematic arrangement-but one ill-suited to direct application as a code of statutes in a court of law (as the British would learn).
Dharmaśāstra also contains numerous procedural rules, including some that could be called rules of recognition, at least within a Brahmin milieu. The most basic of these, found 10 . E.g., the Javanese Adhigama, Pūrvādhigama, Devāgama, and Kuṭāra-Mānava, the Burmese dhammasatthas or dhammathats, and the Thai thammasats.
11. Subbarayalu (1991: xiii) made this observation in publishing a collection from one family in the Tiruchirapalli District. These records, consisting of inscribed palm leaves bearing the legal fee stamps typical of the colonial legal system, do indeed often mimic the structure and idioms of the inscriptions. Besides Subbarayalu's unique volume, Zoë Headley and S. Ponnarasu, likewise under the auspices of the Institut français de Pondichéry and with funding from the British Library, are coordinating a project to rescue and digitize 40,000 legal documents of the Tamil region, ca. . This archive will provide a much wider base for a study of indigenous legal writing in the early modern and colonial eras.
12. "The region to the east of where the Sarasvatī (River) disappears, west of Kālaka forest, south of the Himalayas, and north of Pāriyātra mountains is the land of the Āryas. The practices of that land alone are authoritative" (prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād dakṣiṇena himavantam udak pāriyātram etad āryāvartam | tasmin ya ācāraḥ sa pramāṇam | Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra (BDhS) 1.2. 9, Olivelle 2000: 198-99) .
13. Ludo Rocher (1993: 267) suggests that rules in Dharmaśāstra "were, indeed, at some time and in some place 'governing the life and conduct of people.'" in several forms, seek to establish what counts as dharma. For example, the Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra (ĀpDhS) begins:
athāto sāmayācārikān dharmān vyākhyāsyāmaḥ | dharmajñasamayaḥ pramāṇam | vedāś ca | ĀpDhS 1.1.1-3 1.1.1. Now we shall explain the laws consisting in agreed-upon practice. 2. The consensus of dharma-knowers is the standard. 3. And the Vedas.
Elsewhere in that work, a pair of maxims reinforces the predominance of collective human authority over any transcendent source of dharma:
na dharmādharmau carata āvaṃ sva iti | na devagandharvā na pitara ity ācakṣate 'yaṃ dharmo 'yam adharma iti | yat tv āryāḥ kriyamāṇaṃ praśaṃsanti sa dharmo yad garhante so 'dharmaḥ | ĀpDhS 1.20.6-7 1.20.6. Dharma and adharma do not go around saying, "Here we are!" Nor do gods, Gandharvas [angels], or ancestors declare, "This is dharma and that is adharma." 7. An activity that Āryas praise is dharma, and what they deplore is adharma. 14 Although the Āpastamba here seems to relegate Veda to secondary status, the general view stipulates that ācāra is valid only to the extent that it does not contravene scripture. Scripture is even invoked on a few occasions to justify one rule over another, for example, to support the paternity claim of a biological father over his child in an adulterous union (ĀpDhS 2.13.5-6; cf. BDhS 2.3.34; VDhS 17.9).
On the other hand, the very next sentences warn readers that some of the conduct depicted in scripture is not legitimate in the present day, since the ancients had "extraordinary power" that people lack in later ages (2. 13.7-9) . The sūtra goes on to consider several practices attributed to "some" or to "some regions": the giving away or formal sale of children, primogenitary inheritance, and other unequal divisions of an estate (2.13.10-2.15.1). These practices are declared invalid on the basis of textual authority: "That is forbidden by the śāstras" (tac chāstrair vipratiṣiddham). After some further examples of good customary practices, the discussion closes: "By this, the rules followed in regions and families are explained" (etena deśakuladharmā vyākhyātāḥ).
Gautama-Dharmasūtra 11.19-22, after listing the textual sources of Dharma, specifies that "the dharmas of regions, castes, and families are also authoritative if they are not in conflict with the sacred scriptures. Farmers, merchants, herdsmen, moneylenders, and artisans exercise authority over their respective groups. [The king] should dispense Dharma after he has ascertained the facts from authoritative persons of each group." 15 Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra (1.2.1-9) goes so far as to recognize specific deviant regional norms, though it admits that Gautama accepts only those practices found in Āryāvarta.
Vasiṣṭha-Dharmasūtra, the latest of the sūtras (1st c. b.c.e.), expresses what becomes the consensus view (1.17): "Where Vedic warrant is lacking, Manu has endorsed the dharmas of one's region, caste, or family" (deśadharma-jātidharma-kuladharmāñ śrutyabhāvād abravīn manuḥ). Compare this with a provision of the South African Constitution of 1998: " §211(3). The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution 14. Adapting Olivelle's translation (2000: 56-57 and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law." This section recognizes pertinent customary law so long as such law does not violate the Constitution and other relevant constitutionally valid laws (the proviso in this case being to ensure that no customary law be recognized that violates the constitutional principle of equality before the law). In both of these examples, customary rules are allowed to supplement or extend the centralist law so long as they are not allowed to supersede it.
Hart argued that such norms cannot by definition rise to the status of "laws" until some procedural rule is established to define what counts as law. For the most part, he regards customary rules as too informal to count as laws. Apart from the few examples like those cited above, classical Dharmaśāstras rarely commited local norms to writing. The passages cited above, though, do provide explicit procedural rules for determining the status of customary norms as valid Dharma: the customary practice (ācāra) of well-trained Āryas within the boundaries of Āryāvarta is deemed a valid supplement to textual sources (and in fact provided the basis of Smṛti texts [Śāstra] in the first place); local norms (deśadharmas, kulācāra, etc.) are also valid, at least so long as they do not conflict with Veda or Śāstra-and some (e.g., the Baudhāyanas) were inclined to allow them even when they did conflict.
In the modern world, norms generally are accorded legal force only when reduced to writing. On the face of it, in India we seem to find the reverse situation. Unwritten rules appear usually to have been the only ones accepted in court hearings. Davis (2010: 13-15) describes Dharmaśāstra as a form of jurisprudence, designed for establishing legal principles and training legal minds. This characterization suits perfectly the later products of the tradition: the commentaries and topically arranged compendia of the medieval age. The versified codes transmitted under the names of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Bṛhaspati, and others, however, though they surely served such purposes as well (Gagarin's "propaganda") , outwardly take the form of rules: part constitution, part procedural law, part substantive laws, often quite detailed, defining crimes and torts, prescribing courtroom process, and proposing penalties and other remedies. They have their roots in older rulebooks, the codes that spell out the standard forms of Vedic ritual practice. The dispute over whether they contain laws or not pivots not so much on how they are framed as on the absence of direct evidence that they were applied in legal practice.
But direct evidence for everyday life in premodern India is patchy in the extreme: plentiful in a few areas of life and sparse in many more, leaving vast swaths in total, cavernous obscurity. In what follows, I will shine the lantern on a few inscriptions, twinkling nuggets of legal practice that lie exposed to view in the bedrock of the epigraphic record. Although the evidence is scattered, it will be sufficient to show that writing in classical and medieval India served a wide range of legal purposes, well beyond those of the Dharmaśāstra. legislation Now let us say for the moment that Gagarin is right that the Greeks' peculiarity is that they used writing to legislate and to publicize laws, and let us acknowledge the usual view that Indians (like many other premodern peoples) did not do so, but rather used writing only for propaganda, scholarship, and documentation. How then should we account for the existence of inscriptions that either record or invoke explicit rules that seem to have the character of fixed laws?
The "Charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa" As in many other ancient societies, the royal decree seems to serve as a basic mechanism of formal legislation, at least where its purpose is to institute or endorse a rule or set of rules to govern conduct on a regular basis. Examples of this are rare, especially in the early epigraphy, but they are not altogether absent. The most famous example is known as the "Charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa" (592 c.e.), 16 a list of over seventy rules based on the customary rules (ācāra) of a merchant-community (vāṇig-grāma), by whom a Maitraka-era ruler had been petitioned (vijñapta) to document and publish them in writing in a "charter of statutes" (sthiti-pātra). 17 The notion that a king should have a record of his subjects' customary laws in writing is well established in śāstra. The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (KAŚ 2.7.2) explicitly prescribes that the Bureau of Official Records (nibandha-pustaka-sthāna) should keep a record of the "laws, conventions, customs, and canons with respect to regions, villages, castes, families, and associations" (deśa-grāma-jāti-kula-saṅghānāṃ dharma-vyavahāra-caritra-saṁsthānam). 18 The Maitraka dynasty, founded in Saurashtra in western India by a regional vassal of the imperial Guptas, reigned from Valabhi from the late fifth century through the middle of the eighth. Viṣṇuṣeṇa, a contemporary of the Maitraka ruler Dharasena II, issued the charter in his authority as mahāsāmanta, a title which during the sixth century in this region came to be adopted by feudatories; in this charter, it is included along with four other titles, together constituting the 'five titles' (pañca-mahāśabda), first used by Dhruvasena I (525-45) in deference to the Gupta emperor. 19 By the middle of the century, the Maitrakas had ceased to pay allegiance to the Guptas, 20 and their own governors in turn began to style themselves mahāsāmanta; such seems to be the case of Viṣṇuṣeṇa.
Viṣṇuṣeṇa's charter is an unusual record, and given how little we know from other sources about its social and political context, much of the technical terminology it uses-official titles, legal categories, names of particular taxes and fees-remains rather opaque. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognize that these statutes are broadly intended to set certain limits on how the state and its representatives may impose on its subjects, and on the merchants in particular, but the statutes also regulate civil harms, trade practices, and legal process, and set fees and fines of many sorts. Here I offer the first complete translation of the inscription. 21 (Given our lack of knowledge about the context and particular usage of the terms of art employed, the precise force of many of these rules cannot be explained. Where an asterisk precedes a rule, the rendering should be considered particularly tentative and uncertain.) 16 . In interpreting this document, I have considered the discussions of Sircar 1958 , Kosambi 1959 , Gopal 1963 , Sohoni 1987 , Virkus 2004 , and Ray 2004 17. Naturally, the translation of technical terms like pātra (= pattra) and sthiti can only be approximate. Pattra (lit., 'leaf') is, however, always a physical document, whether written on a leaf, a sheet of copper, or stone. The term sthiti, which like 'statute' is derived from the verb 'to stand', definitely denotes a rule clearly formulated by an authoritative person or body, as opposed to a customary standard or norm expressed less formally. In India, as elsewhere, these categories have probably never been not altogether distinct.
18. Translation after Olivelle 2013: 111. In a personal communication, Olivelle notes an illustrative example described by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in which an Ābhīra tribesman admits all the evidence presented that he has committed adultery but claims innocence on the grounds of tribal custom, recorded in the king's books, which overrides other legal considerations (Smṛticandrikā, vol. 3.1, p. 24) .
19. On the meaning of sāmanta and of the title mahāsāmanta 'subordinate neighboring king': Gopal 1963; on the pañcamahāśabdas (mahākārttākṛtika-mahādaṇḍanāyaka-mahāpratīhāra-mahāsāmanta-mahārāja) : Sircar 1958: 167; 1966 : 175, 177. 20. Gopal 1963 [sthiti 5] puruṣāparādhe strī na grāhyā | A woman should not be arrested for the crime of her husband.
[sthiti 6] kṣemāgnisamutthāne chalo na grāhyaḥ | In the event that a safely laid fire spreads, no frivolous complaint shall be entertained.
[sthiti 7] svayaṃhrasite karṇṇe chalo na grāhyaḥ | In the event of a "self-shortened ear," no frivolous complaint shall be entertained. 27 [sthiti 8] artthipratyartthinā vinā vyavahāro na grāhyaḥ | No suit is to be entertained where a plaintiff or a defendant is absent.
22. Njammasch 1997 presents a partial treatment of official titles and address formulas in Maitṛka records. 23. Or "tariff-collection office," if dhruva-here is short for dhruvasthāna, explained by Sircar as "a station for the collection of the king's fixed grain share " (1966: 96) .
24. The royal third person plural is used. 25. The numbering of the rules (as in Sircar) and most of the rule-final daṇḍas have been supplied here. 26. Kauṭilya uses a participle derived from verbal root (bhid-) underlying bheda in a more general prohibition against "someone breaking into a sealed house" (samudraṃ gṛham udbhindataḥ). For unmara, cf. Pali ummāra 'threshold' (Cone 2001: 506) .
27. This seems to mean a self-inflicted injury for the sake of falsely incriminating another (cf. sthiti 37); this may have been an idiom to designate to all such feigned injuries.
[sthiti 9] āpaṇe āsanasthasya chalo na grāhyaḥ | A frivolous complaint shall not be entertained from someone who is seated in the market.
[Fees and other obligations]
[sthiti 10] gośakaṭaṃ na grāhyaṃ | An oxcart may not be seized.
[sthiti 11] sāmantāmātyadūtānām anyeṣāṃ cābhyupāgame śayanīyāsanasiddhānnaṃ na dāpayet | One may not require anyone to provide bed, seat, or prepared food when royal vassals, ministers, envoys, or others come through.
[ 28. I understand this to be a rule protecting a shop-keeper from having to pay fees to multiple guilds. 29. See Silk (2008, ch. 5) on the meaning of vārika as a monastic functionary in Buddhist sources. He observes that this sometimes verged on a rather menial status, as in the case of the upadhivārika, something like a sexton or caretaker in the monastery, responsible in various sources for tending the monastery when the monks were away, cleaning, setting out seats and incense, and announcing the date every evening . In this respect, it can be reconciled with the explanation of some epigraphical usage proposed by Tewari (1987: 210) : "household attendants of the kings whose main duty was to fetch water and attend to the bath of the king," although the association with bathing in particular is based on a dubious connection with the word vāri 'water'.
30. According to Sohoni (1987: 277) , "words spoken by talking birds" (!?). Could syālī 'wife's sister' be meant? KAŚ 3.11.28 puts the syāla 'wife's brother' at the head of its list of persons excluded from serving as witness, and although most of those listed are allowed in cases of assault, the syāla is one of three explicitly excluded even in that case.
31. Cf. BṛhSm 1.1.165: gavāṃ pracāre gopālāḥ sasyārambhe kṛṣīvalāḥ in connection with summons to court (āhvāna), and in the list of those who should not be detained (anāsedhyaḥ).
[sthiti 21] gṛhāpaṇasthitānāṃ mudrāpatrakadūtakaiḥ sāhasavarjjam āhvānaṃ na karaṇīyaṃ | While they are at home or in the market, persons should not be summoned to court by messengers with sealed letter except in the case of violent crime.
[ 33. Bṛhaspati-Smṛti 1.1.136-37: "he who is engaged in a sattra ritual or in marriage rites" (sattrodvāhodyataḥ) is among those "who may not be detained" (nāsedhyāḥ).
34. Cf. Kātyāyana-Smṛti (KātySm) 117: "But if the plaintiff does not provide a suitable surety for his suit, he should remain under guard, and pay wages to the officer at the end of the day" (atha cet pratibhūr nāsti kāryayogyas tu vādinaḥ | sa rakṣito dinasyānte dadyād bhṛtyāya vetanam).
35. dhārmika used in this sense is not found elsewhere; it appears to be a mandatory surcharge of some sort, perhaps ostensibly intended to support charitable or religious purposes. The word dharma is commonly used in inscriptions to denote a pious act or benefaction.
36. The meaning of peṭavika is unknown. Sircar (1958: 173) suggests a possible connection with Marathi peṭh ("a trading town or emporium").
If managers even of the higher families do not present themselves before the court registrar when called up thrice by the chātra (summoner) they are subject to a fine of 2 1 ⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 30] vyavahārābhilekhitakakaraṇasevakasyāmadhyāhnād ūrdhvaṃ nirupasthitasya vinayo rupakāḥ ṣaṭ sapādās saha dhārmmikeṇa | For a clerk responsible for recording cases who is not present from midday onwards, the fine is 6 1 ⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[ 37. This and the preceding sthiti both appear to concern complaints brought late in the day, when the proper official was apt to be absent. As in sthitis 6, 7, and 9 above, the word chala seems to mean a complaint falling short of a properly registered case. The term is discussed further below.
38. My translation follows the suggestions of Gopal (1963: 22) , who points out that here and in similar Dharmaśāstra rules, the term sāmanta should be understood as 'neighbor'.
39. My translation assumes that we have here an early form of the land-assessment term surviving in Gujarati phāḷavaṇī and Marathi phāḷaṇī ("Settling the phāḷā [cess upon the ryots]": Molesworth 1857: 553). The phonological disparity might well be due to Sanskritic back-formation from a Prakritic form, or simply inconsistent orthography. Other interpretations of phālāvane that have been offered make little sense.
40. Suspending and cutting of ears (and nose) are punishments listed in the Arthaśāstra (4.8.22; 4.10.10, etc.) Kosambi (1959: 288) : "46). The (royal share of) bell-metal utensils is accepted at the (royal) warehouse after mass inspection and weight-checking, on Āṣāḍha full-moon. No (other) fee at the (royal) warehouse." 45. Kosambi: "wet-ginger"; Sircar notes that alla means 'wet' in Pali and 'ginger' in Prakrit, but also observes that the Sanskrit form ārdraka 'ginger' occurs in no. 60. 46. Sircar (1958: 176 n. 5) notes that the Divyāvadāna uses atiyātrā in the sense of 'fare for crossing a boundary' (Cowell and Neil, 1886: 92, ll. 27-28) . Varṣa-paryuṣitā might be expected rather to mean 'who have resided through the rainy season', but the order in which the levies are mentioned suggests that the merchants are arriving from outside first and then departing again.
[ Hail! From Darpapura, the vassal lord Avanti, being in good health, informs all his own and others whom it may concern: Let it be known to you that, by me, the above-recorded charter of statutes of the merchant group residing in Lohāṭa-village, issued by Śrī Viṣṇubhaṭa, is endorsed by me as well, so that no one may obstruct those who are residing here in accordance with the above-recorded charter of statutes in writing, and who by their own commerce are sustaining themselves. Year 357 Kārttika dark 7th.
To Sircar (1958: 169) , these "look like prevalent customary laws without much modification." It is true that many of these rules have no close parallels elsewhere, but Sircar and others have allowed the novelties to blind them to signs of textualism. It is has not been noted before how many of these rules use technical terminology distinctive of the Dharmaśāstra literature, especially to designate basic legal categories and roles. These include terms for legal process: vyavahāra ('lawsuit'), āvedana ('formal complaint', no. 17; cf. YDh 2.5); for persons appearing in court: arthin ('plaintiff') and pratyarthin ('defendant'), sākṣin ('witness', no. 17), abhiyukta ('the accused', no. 22; cf. YDh 2.9ff.); and for the formal grounds of litigation: vākpāruṣya and daṇḍapāruṣya (verbal assault and physical assault, nos. 18 and 38), ṛṇādāna ('nonpayment of debt', no. 23). Nos. 27 and 32, dealing with the mechanism for the daily setting of prices at market and the fine for 'price manipulation' (argha-vañcana), parallel the precepts in YDh 2.249-51.
49. Kosambi understands this to mean that these craftsmen are expected to perform their work in the palace at half the normal rate. Sircar proposes that kolika = kaulika, chimpaka = Prakrit chimpaya, Gujarati chipo, and that padakāra might be shoemaker or a walking hawker of goods (Hindi paukār). Hemacandra uses the word chimpa to describe calico fabric.
Forms of the verb grah-are used in the charter in at least two distinct senses: for the seizure or detention of persons or things by state authorities, and for acceptance of complaints (chala) or a suits (vyavahāra) The word chala is not used there, although a similar suggestion of deceit or false pretense is implied by vibrūyuḥ. Chala, 50 both in Dharmaśāstra and in Nyāya thought, is understood as misrepresentation or misleading disputation (MDh 8.49; YDh 2.19; Nyāya-Sūtra 1.2.10-18), but here it appears to have a slightly different if similarly negative sense. In sthitis 6, 7, and 9, chala relating to certain (unclear) circumstances is rejected; the other rules with which these are grouped (sthitis 5 and 8) concern the acceptance of a lawsuit (vyavahāra). In this context, chala may mean 'frivolous complaint' or 'unsubstantiated charge'. The one other occurrence of the word is in sthiti 31, which should probably be understood in light of the preceding two sthitis. All three concern uttara-kulika-vārikas, a class of market managers apparently of a higher order. Sthiti 30 prescribes a penalty if (what appears to be) the registrar of cases in the lawcourt is absent after midday, while 31 stipulates that there shall be no chala on the part of those market managers during that same time. With no more to go on, I interpret this to mean that the court will not consider complaints even from high market officers that come in late in the day without properly registering a case. The implication may be that such a complaint would be more likely to be frivolous or unsubstantiated.
Arthaśāstra 3.20.22 does use the word in a comparable way, to denote invalid legal claims: judges should initiate cases for those who are unable to do so for themselves, and "may not dismiss [such cases] on the pretext of place, time, or 'enjoyment' [i.e., another party's claim based on longtime possession and use of the property in question]" (na ca deśa-kāla-bhogacchalenātihareyuḥ). Dismissing a case on the basis of a false pretext or spurious claim is itself a punishable offense (KAŚ 4.9.15) . Indeed, our charter may provide a better understanding of a maxim found here and in Dharmaśāstra:
evaṃ kāryāṇi dharmasthāḥ kuryur acchala-darśinaḥ | samāḥ sarveṣu bhāveṣu viśvāsyā loka-sampriyāḥ || KAŚ 3.20.24 In this way, Justices should try lawsuits without engaging in deceit, being impartial to all persons, inspiring trust, and being loved by the people. (Olivelle 2013: 222) I suggest that the first line ought to be understood as: "In this way, justices should try lawsuits without considering false claims. . . ."
Although the Dharmaśāstras use the word grāhya to affirm or deny what statements are "admissible" in a suit, 51 they and the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra also use forms of grah-to mean 'arrest, detain ' (e.g., KAŚ 2.36.38, 4.8.5, 7.5.22 ; YDh 2.283). But whereas YDh 2.266-69 offers a number of possible justifications for "arrest on suspicion" (śaṅkayā grāhyaḥ) and the Arthaśāstra allows arrest of a "suspect" (śaṅkitaka) within three days of the 50. On the term chala in this record, Sircar writes (1966: 72) : " crime (4.8.5) , this is by contrast explicitly and (it seems) generally prohibited by the fourth statute of our charter. 52 The fifth rule has a parallel in the Arthaśāstra. KAŚ 3.11.22-24 stipulates that a wife may not be arrested (agrāhya) for her husband's unpaid debt unless she was a formal party to it (or unless they belong to certain groups; cf. YDh 2.48; NSm 1. [15] [16] , though a husband may be arrested for his wife's debt if it arose from his leaving her without financial support.
There are at least two ways of explaining the obtrusive presence of this legal terminology. Either it reflects the influence of the Brahmanical codes, or else the Brahmanical śāstras may be codifying legal conceptions and institutions already current in practice. The fact that the inscription is in Sanskrit rather than Prakrit makes the former scenario of top-down influence a bit more likely; if the legal terms were drawn from common use in the courts, one might have expected more Prakritisms even in a Sanskrit record. On the other hand, the use of the word chala found here might reflect a usage distinct from that of scholastic discourse.
Of course, this need not be an either/or dichotomy. It is likely that Dharmaśāstra has picked up and formalized elements of an untextualized practical legal system; it should not be astonishing if systems of legal practice have been influenced by some of the technical elements of Sanskritic discourse. But there are other signs that this charter was drafted by someone quite conversant with Dharmaśāstra. For example, among those excused from peremptory summons to court are "those engaged in yajña, sattra, or wedding rites, and the like" (sthiti 22). One can understand a rule protecting the sanctity of a wedding or funeral ceremony, but the yajña (Vedic sacrifice) at the head of the list stands out as a particularly Brahmin concern, and one certainly wonders why the sattra is mentioned: sattras are Vedic rites that can be performed only by Vedic Brahmin priests, so it should in theory be of no relevance to a guild of merchants. Its inclusion here can only be explained by its being modeled on a śāstric rule such as Bṛhaspati-Smṛti 1.1.136-37, which includes "him who is engaged in a sattra ritual or in marriage rites" (sattrodvāhodyataḥ) in the list of persons "who may not be detained" (nāsedhyāḥ).
The most important parallel with Dharmaśāstra, to my eye at least, is the provision tacked on at the end of the list of statutes: "And whatever customary norms may already be current, those too I approve." Sweeping acknowledgments of customary norms occur also in the Sanskrit codes: 53
jāti-jānapadān dharmān śreṇī-dharmāṃś ca dharmavit | samīkṣya kuladharmāṃś ca svadharmaṃ pratipādayet || MDh 8.41
He who knows the Law should examine the Laws of castes, regions, guilds, and families, and only then settle the Law specific to each.
sadbhir ācaritaṃ yat syād dhārmikaiś ca dvijātibhiḥ | tad deśa-kula-jātīnām aviruddhaṃ prakalpayet || MDh 8.46
He should ratify the acknowledged practices of virtuous men and righteous twice-born individuals, if such practices do not conflict with those of a particular region, family, or caste. 52. Sthiti 4 seems to imply a distinction analogous to the one between avaṣṭambhābhiyoga 'accusation based on certainty' and śaṅkābhiyoga 'accusation on suspicion' made by Vijñāneśvara in his Mitākṣarā comments on ordeals in YDh 2.96. Brick (2010: 32-33) understands avaṣṭambhābhiyoga to imply an accusation formally registered in a court of law (in which case women and certain other classes of person cannot perform an ordeal), in contrast to "general suspicion of guilt" without formal indictment, which the accused may seek to dispel by undergoing an ordeal at his or her own initiative and expense, even if she be a woman.
53. All four Dharmasūtras recognize the validity of similar local variations of dharma: ĀpDhS 2.14.7, 2.15.1, 2.17.17; BDhS 1.2.1-8, 1.11.26; GDhS 11.20-22; VDhS 1.17, 19.7. The Arthaśāstra invokes the same principle more specifically as applying in the regulating of transactions (vyavahāra-sthāpanā):
sve sve tu varge deśe kāle ca svakaraṇakṛtāḥ sampūrṇācārāḥ śuddhadeśā dṛṣṭarūpa lakṣaṇa-pramāṇaguṇāḥ sarvavyavahārāḥ sidhyeyuḥ || KAŚ 3.1. 15 In each respective group, however, all transactions shall be valid when they are executed at the proper place and time, by someone with proof of ownership, observing all the formalities [ācāras], with valid documentation, and noting down the appearance, distinctive marks, quantity, and quality. [tr. Olivelle] But it is striking to see such a ratification ordained in the first person by an actual ruler. Now it may be that it was Viṣṇuṣeṇa, or his Brahmin adviser, who was responsible for Sanskritizing a set of customary rules. Virkus supposes something similar with regard to the epigraphical legalese in the charter (2004: 146):
Although its significance as testimony for the state of affairs in general in western and northern India in the sixth century should not be overestimated, nevertheless it does provide clues about which questions of economic life, legal and tax structure, as well as administration were regular and stable at a rather local level. This does not exclude the possibility, as has been noted, that Viṣṇuṣeṇa regarded the issuing of the document demanded of him as an opportunity to enforce his own aspirations and wishes as well. Herein may lie an explanation for the fact that the inscription exhibits some external elements that are characteristic of land-grant documents (address formula, appointment of a dūtaka). 54 We may even discern his own aspirations in the decree with which Viṣṇuṣeṇa closes his preamble:
tan mayā bhūtapūrvvasya janapadasyābhūtapūrvvasya ca parirakṣaṇa sanniveśanā yātmīyaṃ sthitipātraṃ prasādīkṛtaṃ So I have graciously issued my own charter of statutes in order to protect and settle the country side, both the previously established [areas] and those which are not.
It may be no coincidence that this parallels the phrasing with which the Arthaśāstra introduces the king's duties: 55 bhūtapūrvam abhūtapūrvaṃ vā janapadaṃ . . . vā niveśayet || KAŚ 2.1.1 He should settle the countryside, whether it has been settled before or not . . .
Be that as it may, we can certainly observe that both authors (Viṣṇuṣeṇa and his successor, Avanti) are quite conscious of the charter as a physical text and an authoritative document, alluding to it directly five times in varying terms as a charter (pātra) or settlement (vyavasthā) of statutes (sthiti) or customary statutes (ācārasthiti). In his endorsement, Avanti twice refers to the "above-written charter." Even certain statutes cross reference others: statute 59 cites "the charge for merchandise as written above (yathoparilikhita-)," probably referring to the various rates detailed in statutes 53-58. So while it is likely that the ācāras of other social groups were crystalized in rules transmitted orally written on perishable materials, we cannot be sure whether or not the rendering of these rules in Sanskrit, as a permanent written document, simultaneously endowed them with a more śāstric character.
Other Records of Sthitis
Even if, in presenting an entire code, the Charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa remains an outlier among surviving early inscriptions, other Gupta-era records attest to the notion that customary practice could be invoked as law before official decision-making bodies. Thus a copper-plate record of 432-33 from Bengal 56 during the reign of Kumāragupta I seems to record that a brahmin petitioned a court to be granted endowed lands according to local rules:
- ---vakīrtti-kshemadatta-goṣṭhaka-varggapāla-piṅgala-śuṅkaka-kāla-[5] -
---viṣṇu-[deva]śarmma-viṣṇubhadra-khāsaka-rāmaka-gopāla-[6]
----śrībhadra-somapāla-rāmādyaka(?)-grāmāṣṭakulādhikaraṇaś ca [7] -
---viṣṇunā vijñapitā iha khādāpāra-viṣaye nuvṛtta-maryyādāsthi[ti]-[8]
- [te] ). So you should today give to me accordingly." . . . When the aforenamed individuals had gathered, and everything had been settled by the neighboring landholders, . . . and they had given their assent to the arrangement, saying "that is agreed upon," . . . a one-kulāvāpa field measuring eight by nine nalas was detached and given. Then, this land was given by the official (āyuktaka (Basak 1923-24) . 57. For the institution, see Bhandarkar's remarks in CII 3, 2e, 286 n. 7. 58. Lakṣmeśvara Kannada stone inscription of the Cālukya Yuvarāja Vikramāditya II of about 725 c.e., edited and partially translated in EI 14.14 by Barnett (1917-18: 190-91 Obligations to the guild of braziers and the guild of oil-pressers are mentioned further on, though the record becomes increasingly illegible and obscure.
A final example of a decree recognizing customary norms concerns practices associated with marriage. In the late eleventh century, the governor of Vengi, a son of the reigning Eastern Cālukya king Kulottuṅga I, issued an edict (śāsana) confirming the ceremonial privileges claimed by a cluster of families based on a formal recognition of old customary norms: 60 [108] .
. .|| śrīvijayarājya[saṃ]vatsara saptadaśe dattasyāsya śāsana[sy][ā*]jñaptiḥ kaṭakādhipaḥ karttā [109] viddaya(bhaṃ)bhaṭṭaḥ lekhaka[ḥ*] pennācāryyaḥ ||
[While Rājarāja Choḍagaṅga was ruling the whole earth, he] called together all the Rāṣṭrakūṭas and other peasants living between the Mannēṟu (river) and the Mahendra (mountain) and issued the following order (ittham ājñāpayati) in the presence of the councillors, the family priest, the commander of the army, the heir-apparent, the door-keepers, and the ministers:
[vv. 38-41] "[Among my family's many servants, those] who have protected the Cālukya kings at the beginning with their riches, with their lives, (and) with their courage and other virtues; who have come already at the beginning with king Vijayāditya, the lord of Ayodhyā, who was desirous of conquering the southern region; the peasants dwelling in the town Vijayavāṭā, the capital of the kings (who were) ornaments of the race of the Moon (Rājavaṃśa);
[90] "And who are born in the Teliki family, whose minds are intent on the performance of their duties, (and) who are known to be divided into a thousand families such as Velumanūllu, Pattipālu, Nariyūllu, Kumuḍāllu, Maṟṟūllu, Pavaṇḍlu, Srāvakulu, Uṇḍrūllu, Anumagoṇḍalu, and Aḍḍanūllu.
[92] "Be it known to you that, being pleased by (their) great devotion, we have now granted to these people by a decree (śāsana), as long as the moon and sun shall last, that when marriage festivals are celebrated at all places such as Vijayavāṭa and all other towns, cities, villages, and hamlets (?), the married couple may proceed on the roads on horse-back, and that afterwards when, at the end of the marriage festival, they place a pair of valuable cloths at the feet of the king and prostrate themselves, betel will be given (to them) in a golden vessel, (as) handed down by old custom.
"This dharma must be assiduously protected by the kings descended from our family." [Imprecatory verses follow.]
The executor (ājñapti) of this edict, which was given in the seventeenth year of the prosperous and victorious reign, (was) the commander of the camp (kaṭakādhipa); the composer, Viddayabhaṭṭa; (and) the writer Pennācārya.
The authoritative basis for the decree is that the norm has been "handed down by prior custom" (pūrva-maryādā-samāgatam) , what in English Common Law is called "immemorial custom." The circumstances in which this custom was contested we do not know, but making it the object of a royal decree-the word śāsana denotes the order and the physical document equally-adds an implicit threat of enforcement. The enactment is further called a dharma, a multivalent usage implying both the legal act itself and the principle that underlies it. It bears emphasizing that, as the Dharmasūtras quoted above affirm (pace Austin), a customary rule like this is a dharma even before a king ratifies it or throws the force of the state behind it.
Criminal Law Promulgated by a Brahmin Council without Royal Order
We must wait until the twelfth century for an unambiguous example of legislation by caste council that is given public written form: the stone slab found in Lāhaḍapura, Gazipur District (Uttar Pradesh). It records an agreement (a saṃvid) reached by the local Brahmins (dvijas) in 1173, which by virtue of being inscribed constitutes a sthiti, a fixed statute, prescribing the punishments appropriate to crimes against the village, including cattle-rustling. Separate sanctions are prescribed for the brigand (presumed to come from outside) and any local "accessory" (upastambhadāyaka) who may connive with him:
[1] (siddham) svasti | śrījayaccaṃdradevasya rājye saṃvatsare mite | [2] khāgnyarkkaiḥ 1230 āśvine māse pakṣe [kṛṣṇe] This inscription stands out from the mass of contemporary records in several respects. It makes no reference to royal authority other than to date the decision to the reign of a king. It is quite short, consisting wholly of five anuṣṭubh verses in Sanskrit, containing the substance of the law, with no introductory praśasti (royal panegyric) or concluding formulas. The fact that it was inscribed on a stone slab suggests that it was meant to be on public view. But it may not have been associated with any temple, and the only deity mentioned is the Sun, who (as so often in oaths) is invoked as universal witness to the enactment. So a public, civic context is likely.
The text, being in Sanskrit verse, could not be presumed to be understood by all and sundry, but if it were meant to apply only (or mainly) within a Brahmin village it may still be considered as being for public edification.
No formal governing body (viz., sabhā) is explicitly mentioned, although such a body may be implicit in the attribution of the decision to the "twice-born." Given that the record is composed in verse, the choice of terminology may be dictated by metrical or stylistic concerns. In short, we seem to have here a piece of legislation promulgated formally by a local body, and publicized in a polished written form.
From the other end of the subcontinent, less than fifty years later, we find a Tamil temple inscription recording a resolution by a local non-Brahmin assembly (naṭu) to provide protection to cultivators (kuṭimakkaḷ) of several villages attached to the temple. 62 As in the Lāhaḍapura sthiti, the rule addresses the problem of "cattle rustling and other mischief": [9] We, the members of the nāṭu [local council] of Kūrappāttālvu Caturvetimaṅkalam of Vallanāṭu in Rājarājavaḷanāṭu, having met, on the third day of the month of Kaṛkaṭakam in the sacred pavilion of Lord Tēvumtirivum in the holy temple of the Nāyanār of Tiruvarankuḷam, all members being present, recorded the following resolution, which we unanimously passed, and inscribed it on stone: "We shall protect the cultivators (kuṭimakkaḷ) residing within bounds of this place sacred to the Nāyanār (saints) . . . While they are under our protection, if anyone rustles cattle or commits other such mischief, we shall confiscate two mās of wetland and plant the trident stone on its boundaries as forfeit to the god, and restore whatever is stolen or plundered. . . ."
We note the double remedy stipulated in case the law be violated: a punitive sanction (confiscation of land, which becomes the divine property) and reparations for the aggrieved party.
Regulation of Administrative Procedures
The Uttaramallūr inscriptions of Parāntaka I (Parakesarivarman, r. from 906) 63 record the king's efforts to reform the administration of a Brahmin settlement (Uttaramerucaturvedimaṅgalam), which had been perverted by "wicked men." In a first attempt, in the twelfth year of his reign , the king sent a non-Brahmin officer called Tattaṉūr Mūvēndavēḷāṉ to promulgate a set of rules to regulate the selection of members of three separate committees in such a way that power could no longer be concentrated in the hands of a small, corrupt group. Two years later, the king had to send a second officer, this time a Brahmin, to refine the regulations, presumably so that they would more effectively exclude the selection of corrupt or corruptible members (including recent past members).
The inscriptions take the form of resolutions issued by the sabhā-"we the members of the assembly of Uttaramerucaturvedimaṅgalam, with [the king's officer] sitting with us by royal order": [11] . . . [i] . . . The royal letter-which the lord of gods, the emperor, the glorious Vīranārāyaṇa, the glorious Pārāntakadeva Parakesarivarman was pleased to issue to the effect that committees should from this year forward be invariably chosen in this way (by drawing) ballots from a pot, for as long as the moon and the sun [endure]-having been received and made known to us, we, the members of the assembly of Uttaramerucaturvedi mangalam, made (this) settlement, (the king's officer) Tattaṇūr Mūvēndavēlāṉ sitting with us by royal order, in order that the wicked men of our village may perish and the rest prosper. [adapted from Venkayya]
The rules stipulate explicitly the qualifications of candidates and ensure a transparent election process. There should be one candidate from each of twelve streets in thirty wards, whose names should be written on leaves and placed in a pot. To qualify as a candidate, a man must be between the ages of thirty-five and seventy, own a minimum amount of taxable land and reside in a house thereon, have learned his Vedic scriptures-higher studies reduce the minimum land requirement-be conversant with business, virtuous, with honest earnings, not have served on any committee in the past three years and not be related in any of twelve specified ways to any former committee member who has not submitted his accounts, and not be guilty of theft or any of a list of unexpiated moral faults (or even expiated ones, in some cases). Explicit rules were also given for the public selection of names: in the presence of temple priests and the full assembly, ward by ward, the names are shaken in a pot and drawn out by an illiterate boy, then passed to a state-appointed madhyastha (official in charge of issuing documents and certifying legal acts, rather like a notary), who receives the leaf on his open palm and reads the name aloud, and passes it to be read out by all the priests. Note the emphasis placed on Sanskrit learning, not only for the committee members but also in the case of the king's second deputy sent to deal with the problem.
Statutory Reform of Marriage Practices
An inscription from a small polity in Vijayanagara-controlled Tondaimandalam in south India, dated Wednesday, 13 February 1426, records a resolution of a Brahmin council to abrogate a disapproved custom (the payment of brideprice) and to replace it with a Dharmaśāstric norm (the marriage called 'gift of a virgin', kanyādāna). 64 This is ordained henceforth to be the only legitimate marriage practice for all Brahmins in the kingdom of Paḍaivīḍu: 65 gold, shall be liable to punishment by the king and shall be excluded from the community of Brāhmaṇas. Thus have written the [undersigned] great men of all branches of sacred studies . . . The rule adopted here takes the form of a statute adopted by a competent legislative body, recorded in a 'document of an agreement establishing a law' (dharmmasthāpana-samayapatram), signed by 'great men learned in every science' (aśeṣavidyamahājanaṅkaḷ), by which are meant the members of the local Brahmin council. Unlike our oldest examples of inscribed laws, this, like the Lāhaḍapura and Tiruvaraṅkulam stone inscriptions, records a law enacted independently by a Brahmin council but in this case explicitly invoking the king's obligation to enforce it (as well as a social sanction). 66 Just a few decades earlier, the south Indian Dharmaśāstrin Mādhava, a minister in the Vijayanagara court, in his commentary on the Parāśara-Smṛti, refined Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa's earlier defense of the practice of cross-cousin marriage by asserting that Dharmaśāstra precepts that seem to prohibit it were only applied to marriages that did not follow the kanyādāna model. This is because a women duly given in marriage in this fashion thereby adopts the lineage markers (sāpiṇḍya and gotra) of her husband in place of those of her father-she is "transsubstantiated," as Trautmann quips-with the consequence that her brother's daughter is no longer too closely related to become her son's bride by Dharmaśāstra rules. Hence, it is likely that the decision recorded in the Paḍaivīḍu inscription was intended precisely to shore up the legitimacy of south Indian Brahmin marriage customs by assuring their conformity to the view of perhaps the most influential Dharmaśāstra authority of Vijayanagara-era south India. 67 This would certainly constitute a fairly direct, if still tacit, influence of Dharmaśāstra on legal practice among Brahmins. The record is explicit, of course, that the decision has no bearing on the marriage practices of non-Brahmins.
Consulting Written Records to Resolve a Dispute
Indian inscriptions (and the epigraphy of Southeast Asia, which early on was largely imitative of Indian practice) exemplify a range of types of legal documents: decrees and orders, deeds of gift or sale, dispute settlements, administrative appointments, etc. The examples discussed here show that at least in a few cases the inscription was used as a means of publishing statutes, usually within a clearly defined jurisdiction.
Besides inscriptions, the existence of formulary compendia such as the Lekhapaddhati (compiled between fourteenth and sixteenth centuries) demonstrates a native awareness of the importance of standardization as a means of ensuring clarity, and as an index of authenticity and official status. 68 In the epigraphy itself we can see signs of the same awareness.
One of these signs is the expression of the sentiment that the creation of a document in itself is meant to resolve the dispute and to prevent its being reopened in the future. A very clear example of this is an extraordinary copper-plate of 1604. It is at once a deed and a vivid first-person account by a non-Brahmin legal agent. In it the would-be title-holder explains in 66. The notion that a decision by a body of learned Brahmins counts as dharma, the recording of such decision in a document, the two types of penalty, and the prescribed form of marriage can all be supported (i.e., validated) by precepts of Dharmaśāstra, although (as usual) none is cited directly. detail the process by which he obtained rights to lands, sought legal documentation of those rights so that his offspring would inherit clear title, and went about making his case. This record is relatively "recent" and unusual in its presentation, but the institution and the legal process that it represents are probably not greatly different from what they were a few centuries earlier. In it the petitioner states: "I told them that, as I am a shepherd, there might be no objection to the right of the sons born to me over the lands that I had acquired, I wanted to execute a copper-plate (document)." He repeats that wish a few lines on: [38] I told them that, as I am a shepherd, in order that there might be no objection to the right of the sons born to me over the lands that I had acquired, I wanted to execute a copper-plate (document). They ordered me to summon the inhabitants of the four villages. Accordingly I assembled at the foot of the pīpal tree at Alampaṭṭi, Tamarākkināṭṭār, Muḍikaṇḍambalakkār of Periyakōṭṭai, the Kavaṇḍars of Kārūru and Kallūruṇi, the Ambalakkārs of Kannāruppu and the Ambalakkār of Kalkuḷam. When they asked me why I brought them, I said that I wanted to execute a copperplate deed so that there might be no dispute about my own lands. 69 What is remarkable about this case is that we see a relatively humble individual taking recourse to a permanent written record in order to secure his legal land rights for his heirs. Although it is unusual for such documents to be preserved in metal (as opposed to perishable palm leaf), its existence suggests that by this time documentation of this sort was produced not only for elites or groups.
Madras Museum Copper-Plate no. 8 provides an even more detailed snapshot of legal practice in the sixteenth century. This copper-plate inscription of 1535 concerns a land dispute between two individuals with competing claims to hereditary rights. The record notes that litigation had dragged on for five years, at great cost. The contending parties, both of whom bore the honorific title of mutaliyār (which was conferred upon a variety of officials and dignitaries), brought their dispute to be heard by three other mutaliyārs, who in turn brought in a fourth. This ad hoc "bench" heard depositions from both sides. Meanwhile, an unnamed local potentate referred to simply as the "Rāyar" ("his Highness," in effect) examined a copper-plate grant that had been submitted as evidence. The four mutaliyārs found that Muttiyappa had "no good claim," and were prepared to give sole rights to Maṉṉakaṭamba, but, in consultation with a mutaliyār from a neighboring region, a "settlement" was made according to which Muttiyappa (who had been cultivating the lands in dispute, though apparently without title, and who had gifted one-twelfth as a religious endowment to Brahmins) was granted one-sixth of the total remaining lands, while the rest was restored to Maṉṉakaṭamba: [3] . . . Poṇṇakari cimaiyil Cin- [4] nakāmaṇattil irukkum Manṉakkaṭamba Mutaliyār ñcivāyal Muttiyappa Mutaliyār yivarkaḷ yirutira- [6] varum kāṇikāṣṣi nimittiyam oṇṇukoṇ-69. Setupati copper-plate grant of 1604, edited and translated by Nateśa Śāstrī in Burgess 1886: 62-65. [On such and such a date,] Maṉṉakkaḍamba Mudaliyār of Śinnakāmaṇam, which is situated in the Poṉṉagari country, and Muttiyappa Mudaliyarof Kāñchivāyal had a dispute among themselves as to their hereditary right to certain lands. They came to us three-Akattiyappa Mudaliyār, Nārāyaṇa Mudaliyār, and Śōṇāttiri Mudaliyār, of Śiravarampeṭṭu-and complained about that matter. We three-and taking with us Tiruvēṅkaṭa Mudaliyār of Peruvāyal-thus we four, took depositions from their own mouths, from both sides. While we four were so engaged, and when the Rāyar was examining the copper-plate, we concluded among ourselves that Muttiyappa Mudaliyār of Kanchivayal had no good claims on his side, that, on the examination of the copper-plate by the Rāyar, it would be settled that Maṉṉakkaḍamba Mudaliyār alone had the sole right to the whole of the Śinnakāmaṇam village, and that, excepting himself, no other person had any kind of right to the said village. But, as both these persons had been spending much money for five years to have their disputes settled, we took an agreement from both of them to Amal Śaṅkaramūrti Mudali of the country of Poṉṉagari, and settled their dispute in the following manner: . . . 70 The document closes with formulas confirming the permanence of the settlement and recording the names of copyist, the engraver, and the four arbitrators. The embedded description comes close to sounding like a modern case brief, but the real purpose of the record was to provide a rationale for the mediated settlement and the relative weight accorded to the earlier copper-plate document and other factors.
conclusion on customary law committed to writing in indian inscriptions
The inscriptions considered above illustrate various ways in which customary standards could be officially recognized (or, in one case, officially abolished): by a resolution of an authoritative body resulting in a publicly displayed legal record or by a ruler setting standards by public order. In both cases, the written record appears to be instrumental, both as a form of publication and as a means of casting the law in a formal and transregionally rec-70. Nateśa Śāstrī translation in Burgess 1886: 155-56. ognizable legal idiom. Although explicit references to Dharmaśāstra are rare, the appeal to Brahmanical learning or to a royal order to establish the validity of laws is consonant with Dharmaśāstra principles.
The processes reflected (and often recorded) in these inscriptions are explicitly intended to ensure the recognition and enduring validity of fixed legal rules. Even though there is no explicit reference to a "rule of recognition" for the laws invoked in such records, most of which are not recorded in any surviving charter or code, that does not mean that customary norms necessarily lack "lawness" in the Hartian sense. In fact, Hart himself suggests that in some legal systems custom may constitute law even before it is made the coercive order of a sovereign or is applied in a court, 71 and Frederick Schauer cautions that the rule of recognition need not be "a rule in any sensible understanding of that term. Rather, the ultimate rule of recognition is best understood as a collection of practices (in the Wittgensteinian sense), practices that may not be best understood in rule-like ways." 72 While some of the inscriptions discussed above may be viewed as examples of customary laws being recast (in classic Austinian mode) as the decree of a sovereign, for which an explicit rule of recognition could be found (along with the coercive threat of sanction that Austin considered a sine qua non of law), most of our examples are the product of "a collection of practices" for which a standard of recognition is deducible even if nowhere explicitly articulated. Dharmaśāstra provides one model of a non-state normative model that seems to offer a rule of recognition for such customary laws, but the inscriptions never draw on that textual resource. the javanese transformation of indic law: the increasing salience of codes
Simultaneously with the development of these legal practices in India, from around the sixth or seventh century, as local elites in coastal areas of present-day Vietnam, Sumatra, Borneo, and Java began to emulate the culture and practices of high classical India, they imported Indic legal concepts and institutions along with prestige goods and other cultural trappings. 73 This emulation-likely motivated by a combination of material and intellectual aspirations-gave rise to royal states that presented themselves according to Indic models and sought to participate in the reciprocal relations with kingdoms in India, with diplomacy (then as now) facilitating both trade and cultural transmission.
From the point of view of local law, Java differs from India in that, besides legal inscriptions, local-language legal codes emerged, codifying Javanese customary norms within a conceptual framework and textual format adapted from India's Sanskrit Dharmaśāstra. 74 The inscriptions include many transactional records, but also (from the early tenth century) a smaller number of records of successful suits (jayapattra or jayasoṅ), which are extremely 71. Hart 1994: 44-48 . He asks, "Why, if statutes made in certain defined ways are law before they are applied by the courts in particular cases, should not customs of certain defined kinds also be so?" (p. 46). 72. Schauer 2013: 532 n. 65. 73 . See the summary by Pollock (2006: 122-34) . 74. The primary sources for Javanese and Balinese law include more than two hundred Old Javanese legal inscriptions between 800 and 1500 ce; and Old and Middle Javanese codes (āgama) inspired by the Sanskrit Mānavadharmaśāstra, Bṛhaspatismṛti, and Kāmandakīya but reflecting mainly local norms. Texts of the latter sort survive today only in more recent manuscripts, in language showing some modern features, but references in the epigraphy suggest that they existed in some form earlier.
rare (and late) in India. 75 Records of this type continued to be cited in litigation in Dutch colonial courts up to the eighteenth century. 76 In a recent study of the linguistic practices at work in these records, I have suggested that these inscriptions are composed in a specialized legal idiom characterized by the liberal use of Sanskrit legal terms of art inflected according to Javanese rules, and Javanese calques of Sanskrit phrases, resulting in a situation of "functional diglossia" in relation to the non-legal forms of the language. 77 The linguistic phenomenon reflects the transformative role of Indic legal models on indigenous customary norms. The most obvious markers of the Indian conceptual structure are the Sanskrit technical expressions sprinkled throughout the Javanese. Thus, the adjudication of a dispute is described as a pariccheda ('decision') in a guṇadoṣa ('a matter of right and wrong'), a clear echo of Manu's expressions, guṇadoṣaparīkṣaṇam ('investigating what is right and wrong', MDh 1.117d) and guṇadoṣavicakṣaṇam ('distinguishing between right and wrong', MDh 9.169b). 78 Sanskrit loan words designate formal features of Indic juristic process that may have had no parallel in Javanese custom, at least as formal categories: the attestation of witnesses (sākṣī), the official resolution of the case (śuddha-pariśuddha), and the written document recording the outcome (likhitapātra), which concludes with a legalistic phrase in Javanese that has striking parallels in Indian inscriptions: "The purpose of this 'victory-document' is so that the matter may never be spoken of again" (kunaṅ sugyan tatān paṅujara ya muvaḥ dlāhaniṅ dlāha ya donikeṅ jayapātra).
In spite of the many borrowings, the Javanese records exhibit some distinctive terminology. Some of these are Indic borrowings that acquire a specialized usage. Whereas it is common in Indian inscriptions for the word dharma to denote a pious endowment and for the boundaries of a parcel of land to be described as the sīmā, in Javanese, sīma (sometimes dharma sīma) denotes a distinctive Javanese variant of the South Asian land grant. The term sīma is usually translated 'freehold', and Zoetmulder describes it as a property "freed from taxes and other obligations" by decree. 79 Barrett Jones has argued that is it more accurate to say that "the transaction did not interfere with ownership of the land but dealt with the diversion of some of the produce. . . . It seems rather to have been a diversion of taxes or dues from one beneficiary to another; the villagers paid the same amount, but to a different authority " (1984: 60) . 80 A sīma establishment involved an order (usually ājñā) by the king whereby income from a certain property-one or more named villages, or rice-fields (savah), or uncultivated parcels (vatək) to be converted into rice-fields-was assigned to a specified beneficiary, usually a temple.
The terminology is a bit different-the word parihāra ('exemption' from the obligation to make payments to the king) is notably absent-but the similarity of the legal arrangements enacted in the inscriptions are telling. For example, the copper-plate inscription from East Java from 929 includes among the immunities protection from being entered by any of a roster of persons who otherwise have some share in the king's revenues A long list of particular rights and immunities follows. The prohibition on the entry of various persons, although expressed without any Indic loan-words, closely parallels one of the 81. Several similar copper-plate records purporting to derive from this period have survived, but all the others are later copies (tinulad), which are not wholly faithful to their originals.
82. Text as provisionally re-edited by Arlo Griffiths, omitting indications of initial vowels, paten (virāma), and the distinction between different graphs for /ṅ/. The translation given here reflects suggestions made by Griffiths during the Intensive Course in Old Javanese held in Trawas, Mojokerto, East Java, Indonesia, 13-28 June 2014; any errors are my own.
83. The lists of people classified under the label maṅilala dṛvya haji-often translated as 'collectors of royal dues' (Zoetmulder 1976: 191) , or 'taxation officers' (e.g., Boechari 1965: 64)-are quite diverse, and the significance of the status has been a matter of debate. Van Naerssen's discussion (1941: 12-13) is the most comprehensive, and he finds them (in Barrett Jones's words, 1984: 137) to comprise "a group of people on whom the king had a claim, and who in turn could make some claim from others." The elements of the term suggest that such persons had some right to a share of usufruct (kilala), whether in produce or services, of properties belonging to the king, and in the inscriptions it serves metonymically to denote the beneficiaries of such a right (as does, elsewhere, rājavidhi, the royal order conferring such rights; see Zoetmulder 1982 see Zoetmulder : 867, 1487 . Barrett Jones surmises: "The establishment of a sima reduced or extinguished their rights over that sima. The mangilala dṛwya haji clearly were not landowners, nor rice producers, nor producers of other crops. Their names seem to indicate that they were providers of goods and services, or had a claim on such providers; their income then must have come directly or indirectly from these goods and services " (1984: 137) . most common of the protections offered in Indian land-grants, which are "not to be entered by cāṭas or bhaṭas" (acāṭabhaṭapraveśya, or a variation thereof). 84 The content of such privileges, as well as of the forms of taxation and revenue collection from which such land-grants are exempt, vary widely by region and period, so it is not surprising that the corresponding details in the Javanese inscriptions have a distinctly local flavor. Yet it may still be argued that the concept of the land-grant conferring privileges and exemptions, as a socio-economic and legal institution and as a written document to be produced as evidence, is a borrowing from India.
Besides such parallels with epigraphic legal records from India, Javanese records from as early as the eighth century refer to "the essence" (pə h) of Manu's teaching (Mānavaśāsanadharma, Mānava-Kāmandaka) . 85 Parallels are even more striking in the famous Bendosari jayapattra ("Decree Jaya Song," fourteenth c.), 86 which, like several other Majapahit-era inscriptions, refers to a composite tradition called Kuṭāra-Mānava. This inscription (like others from Java) refers to a legal functionary, the 'magistrate' (pragvivaka = Skt. prāḍvivāka), who is prominent in Dharmaśāstras but unknown in Indian inscriptions. 87 We also find the Dharmaśāstric principle of long-term possession (bhukti) presented as evidence of land rights: "People acknowledge me as owner of 33 lirih on the basis of possession. . . that is firm possession since the time of my ancestors" (kabhukti deniṅ amadṛvyakən lirih 33 . . . punika ta sthiti bhukti saṅkeṅ tuha-tuha; plate 5 recto 1), "because it has been in our possession from time immemorial" (makahetu anadi kābhuktyanipun; 5 verso 1). To decide the case: appealed to in Java (1) to provide institutional patterns and conceptual architecture for formal law, and (2) to validate local Javanese standards of justice as law in the Indic sense of dharma. The Javanese situation differed from the Indian one in that it was not simply a matter of recognizing local customary norms under the authority (direct or indirect) of Sanskrit Dharmaśāstra. Rather, in Java and Bali, a local replica of Dharmaśāstra itself was produced in a legal register of the local language. Designed to validate Javanese and Balinese legal rules and procedures, it went so far as to insert local customary standards into the Śāstra itself. The result were codes aspiring to be Dharmaśāstras but reflecting much more directly the "common law." Only a very few, late examples of regional Śāstras (e.g., the Laghudharmaprakāśikā from seventeenth-century Kerala) can be found in India, and then mainly in Sanskrit.
This complex phenomenon may look to modern eyes very different from the production of constitutions and codes of statutes. More obvious analogies can be found in European legal history of around the same period: the Codex Euricianus (or Code of Euric), compiled by a Roman jurist for Euric, the Gothic King of Toulouse, shortly before 480, which recognized the customary norms of the Goths, superficially Romanized; or the Lex Salica, which codified Frankish penal and procedural law under Clovis (early sixth c.). Even more parallel, in that it involved codification in a local language rather than a classical language, is the Kievan code, the Russkaja Pravda, written in East Slavic (Matejka 1977: 195; Feldbrugge 2009: 33-58) . 89 In each of these cases, rulers influenced by an imported classical law (Roman law in Toulouse; Byzantine law in Kiev) sought to endow their subjects' customary norms with not just the garb but the institutional formality of codified law.
Part of what makes all of these cases look unfamiliar as law to modern eyes is that the spread of a classical legal framework within the horizons of a cosmopolitan culture (whether Roman, Byzantine, or Indic) was not centralized; it was not the work of a single nation-state. The standards of recognition were a model that was disseminated by a multi-centered elite, and put into code and practice piecemeal at regional and local levels. If there is a modern analogy, it may be international law, which is growing in importance and reach in an ever more globalized world. In fact, the development and spread of Indic law might well be seen as a precursor-an unwieldy but functional system coordinating the legal affairs of individual states and corporations.
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